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A mong most economists it is well understood that free trade will in general "increase economic growth and welfare by fostering greater efficiency in allocating resources, lowering prices and increasing the variety of options for consumers and producers". 1 Although long neglected by economic theory, in principle these findings also apply to trade in services? However, though governments are well informed about the longterm benefits of free international trade, they have always made use of protectionist means to pursue their short-term interests. This fundamental problem is the basic justification for a legal order to foster and stabilize international trade. But while the need for a free trade regime is unquestioned, the proposed concepts and instruments for that order differ considerably. Especially in the light of the renaissance of protectionism, liberalization strategies are crucial topics for current GATT talks within the Uruguay Round. This is even more true for present efforts to reduce existing obstacles to trade in services. Since developed countries have moved towards service economies, 3 services have become a trade issue. Multinational enterprises, which increasingly depend on services like telecommunications, banking or insurance, press for competitive international service markets. Service providers seek new business opportunities abroad. Countries that enjoy comparative advantages in many service industries, like the USA, push other governments to open their domestic service markets.
The contracting parties to the GATE took these developments into account and decided to put services on the agenda for the Uruguay Round. In addition, bilateral treaties covering trade in services have been concluded, such as between the USA and Canada. Furthermore the European Community (EC) has formulated a trade policy on its own and is moving towards a common service market in Europe. The simultaneous negotiations on the bilateral, regional and global levels yielded a major controversy: while for some bilateral and regional efforts present the only way for effective liberalization, others argue that they distort world trade and undermine multilateral trade negotiations in GATT. The issue is closely intertwined with the discussion on the proper liberalization instrument to be used for trade in services: should future negotiations be predominantly led by the principle of reciprocity or should they first of all be based on the concept of most-favoured-nation treatment? 4 This paper attempts to clarify the discussion and outline rational policy options. A liberalization strategy for trade in services should certainly take into acount 1 H. Klod t : Most-Favoured-Nation Principle and Negotiating Strategies, imP. Robinson, K. Sauvant, V. Govitrikar: Electronic Highways for World Trade, San Francisco, London 1989, pp. 181-195, here 4 It should be noted here that of course there are other issues involved in trade in services: among them are the inclusion of other basic principles in a service agreement, like national treatment, transparency or procedures for dispute settlement; universal vs. sectoral liberalization; or the legal relationship of a free trade regime in services with existing sectora] service regimes. Although these issues will not be dealt with here at length, they will be considered whenever appropriate. For a profound discussion cf. G. F e k e t e k u t y : International Trade in Services -An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations, Cambridge Mass. 1988, pp. 191 et seq.
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theoretic findings, experiences in trade in goods as well as the characteristics of trade in services. Therefore, the first part comprises a comparative analysis of selected liberalization regimes. Subsequently, special characteristics of trade in services that are relevant for our purposes are discussed. The final sections then present an outline for a possible liberalization regime for trade in services.
Alternative Liberalization Regimes
Though international trade liberalization can be initiated through unilateral actions of states, it usually requires negotiations between governments on the bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral level. The two classical instruments used for trade liberalization are the so-called most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) and the principle of reciprocity. Both instruments can be and have actually been embodied in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade treaties. Nevertheless, although reciprocity is strived for on the plurilateral and multilateral level as well, equivalent trade concessions are more likely to be agreed upon in bilateral negotiations. Similarly, though MFN has frequently been inserted in bilateral treaties, its liberalization effect increases with the number of participants. Therefore, MFN is typically associated with multilateral trade regimes. 5
It is useful to discuss first MFN on the multilateral level and then bilateral reciprocity as two models for trade liberalization. This is followed by an evaluation of the existing world trade order in GATT, which tries to integrate different policy regimes and liberalization instruments.
The Multilateral Approach
The underlying objective of the MFN principle 6 is to abolish discrimination between foreign suppliers in international trade. It states that country A is to treat country B under equal conditions as favourably as any other third state. Hence, MFN implies that country B has a right to receive all trade concessions that country A grants to third countries. In addition, countryA is obliged to avoid any governmental or administrative means that prejudice country B compared to third countries. 
The Bilateral Approach: Reciprocity
The bilateral liberalization approach, on the other hand, relies on reciprocity as the guiding negotiating principle. Accordingly, two interested governments agree on the mutual reduction of trade barriers with the intended effect that both parties benefit in like manner from the arrangement. These mutual concessions may be negotiated informally but usually they are embodied as rights and obligations in a bilateral trade treaty. Reciprocity may imply the mutual reduction of identical trade barriers. However, it usually suggests that signatories grant each other equivalent trade concessions in order to exploit inter-sectoral liberalization. Each bilateral treaty usually differs with respect to the level of trade concessions depending on the interests of the relevant parties. Therefore, the difference between a world trade order based on bilateral treaties and a multilateral trade regime based on unconditional MFN is that the former allows preferential treatment between foreign suppliers, which the latter tries to abolish.
Bilateral reciprocity certainly tends to overcome some of the typical problems related to unconditional MFN and multilateral negotiations: 12 first, since the focus lies on equivalent concessions, free-riding is inhibited; second, reciprocity presents an opportune instrument for governments to pursue their short-term political interests. Short-term effects of free trade that harm a government's reputation among voters and interest groups, like structural unemployment or an unfavourable balance of payments, may be kept under control or justified if trade barriers are reduced mutually. What follows is that for political considerations, governments are more inclined to commit themselves to profound liberalization on the basis of reciprocity. In addition, since only two parties are involved, each bilateral trade treaty is concluded readily and can be tailored to the specific trade conditions between the participating countries. Mainly when sensitive trade issues -e. g. national regulation -need to be resolved, bilateral negotiations are valid liberalization strategies. The results may then also serve as models for multilateral negotiations.
Does this suggest that a network of bilateral treaties may be an alternative to a multilateral trade regime? From an economist's point of view, the answer may be no.
Concerning implementation, a network of bilateral not prohibitive transaction costs. treaties causes high if 9 13 Furthermore each bilateral treaty represents a fragile political equilibrium between signatories. Every new bilatoral agreement tends to destroy the equilibrium of former treaties that the two parties have concluded with other trading partners. The latter -if they are affected negatively by the new arrangement -will certainly ask for additional concessions. Hence, multiple trade conflicts and legal uncertainties are typical for a network of bilateral arrangements? 4
In addition, trade creation may come to a standstill and be limited to trade relations between those countries that have sufficient resources to offer equivalent trade concessions. Only the "happy few" may benefit while less developed countries would be left GAB" out. These limitations may cause significant diversion of trade, which in turn leads to a suboptimal allocation of resources. The crucial question then is whether the welfare gains of trade creation attributed to bilateralism are higher than welfare losses of trade diversion likely to occur. There are no easy answers available. Results will depend on various factors, such as the level of preferential treatment, existing cost differences between economies and consumer preferences? 5
There are further problems related to a bilateral trade regime: governments are less reluctant to establish new trade obstacles, since they can be erected selectively and retaliation is predictable. 16 Finally, it should be noted that there have been several cases in economic history where wealthy nations abused their economic power in bilateral trade negotiations against less developed countries? 7
To summarize the previous sections, the bilateral approach focusing on reciprocity may be an alternative for initiating liberalization if multilateral negotiations fail. However, one has to keep in mind that it bears the danger of distorting and destabilizing world trade. The multilateral strategy on the other hand faces difficulties in initiating substantial liberalization, especially when complex and sensitive trade issues are concerned. However, from a normative point of view it should be considered the foundation for a world trade order, since it prevents an inefficient distortion of world markets and stabilizes free trade once in existence.
A Mixed Approach
It was shown above that both models have important strengths as well as serious defects. It is understandable that policy-makers have tried to create is For a more profound analysis of the trade effects of bilateral and regional arrangements cf. H. S i e b e r t : ZOIle IV: Zollunionen und Pr~ferenzzonen, in: Handw0rterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, VoI. mixed regimes. The current international order in trade in goods as embodied in GATE follows this line: reciprocity and MFN are both basic principles in GATI law. The GATT intends to integrate bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral policy regimes towards a global free trade order. This mixed approach can be identified in several areas. Foremost for our purpose are those rules and common practices in GATT that deal with trade negotiations and the relationship between MFN on the one hand and customs unions and free trade areas on the other hand. Finally, the so-called "liberalization clubs" will be analyzed as a rather new liberalization strategy within GATT.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The preamble and Art. XXVIII, 1 of GATT state that multilateral trade negotiations should be based on reciprocity. However, in Art. I of GAT'I,, contracting parties commit themselves to unconditional MFN, and hence trade concessions granted to one country must be extended immediately and unconditionally to all other signatories. 18 In practice, trade negotiations in GATT have been ruled by the so-called "principal supplier" procedure. Accordingly, at first the most important trading powers bilaterally agree upon reciprocal removal of trade barriers. These concessions in turn must be extended multilaterally to all other signatories. 19 Indeed, the combination of reciprocity and unconditional MFN in GAFF had been quite successful in the fifties and sixties in reducing tariffs. 2~ However, as critics have stressed, these achievements are mainly to be attributed to US committment to free trade at that time and to the fact that tariff negotiations are relatively transparent and involve little transaction costs. When 19 The principal supplier rule was a common practice in US trade policy before World War II and dominated tariff negotiations in GAll" until the Kennedy Round. Even when linear tariff reduction was introduced during the Kennedy Round, bilateral negotiations between principal suppliers were still the rule in many sectors. And still today trade liberalization in GATT is hardly possible without prior bilateral or plurilateral agreements between the three trading blocks (USA, European Community, Japan). Cf. R S e n t i, op. cit., pp. 57-60. 
Bilateral and Regional Economic Integration
Though GATF founders obviously judged multilateral trade liberalization to be fundamental, they also intended to capture the trade-creating benefits of bilateral and regional liberalization efforts, At the same time, however, clauses were inserted in GATTto control and minimize trade diversion likely to result from those arrangements. Consequently, Art. XXlV of GATT allows for the establishment of free trade areas and customs unions only if specific conditions are met.
First, duties and restrictive regulations must be removed on all or "substantially" all trade between the constituent territories (paras. 4,8 (a), (b)). Second, trade barriers maintained by a customs union or by the constituent members of a free trade area vis-a-vis nonmembers shall not on the whole be higher than before the arrangement (para. 5 (a), (b)). Third, liberalization is to be completed in a reasonable period of time (para. 5 (c) 24 Preferential treatment for developing countries is justified with the "infant industry" argument. It suggests that developing countries might have comparative advantages in some industries but do not have resources or time to build them up. In order to avoid inefficient allocation of resources, these industries need to be protected temporarily against established industries in developed countries. Although most economists in general subscribe to this point of view, implementation is difficult, since the distinction between infant and inefficient industries is almost impossible. For a profound analysis cf. R. S e n t i, op. 
Liberalization Clubs
Due to the problems of multilateral trade negotiations and to the renaissance of bilateralism, the idea of "liberalization clubs" has recently gained considerable importance in GATT and reputation among scholars. 26 Examples of liberalization clubs are the several codes for the reduction of non-tariff trade barriers that were concluded in the Tokyo Round. 27 Liberalization clubs consist of interested countries that agree on more profound liberalization rules on a conditional MFN basis: trade concessions do not have to be extended to all trading partners but are limited to those countries that are willing to accept these far-reaching liberalization steps. 28 Hence, every club will discriminate against nonmembers and bears the danger of trade diversion. However, by definition every liberalization club must be open to newcomers. Their openness distinguishes them from customs unions and free trade areas, which in principle represent closed arrangements.
The underlying objectives are obvious: a smaller number of countries with similar economic development or common political interest wilt come to a significant removal of trade obstacles within a short period of time."lf intra-club relations produce positive results, dynamic as well as static ones, they induce others to join, which involves paying the price of liberalization. ''29
The crucial question is to what extent liberalization clubs are and should be open to countries willing to adhere to them. "Obviously, there is a trade-off between substance and coverage. If the agreement ... is to be signed only by a limited number of countries, it could include liberalization steps that are not acceptable to others. ''3~ In addition, rules may be tailored too much to the specific trade conditions between the original parties, so that expansion of membership is restricted from the very beginning. 31 Liberalization clubs designed GATF like this are de facto closed and may in effect create similar problems to those known from bilateralism. On the other hand, low price for entrance may increase membership but will limit trade creation. The typical problems bound with multilateralism would come to surface again.
Nevertheless, liberalization clubs have the unique potential to combine the advantages of bilateral and multilateral liberalization strategies. Therefore, they can be regarded as the crucial means to overcome current trade problems.
After having discussed alternative liberalization instruments, how then might a regime for free trade in services look? It was argued above that multilateral application of unconditional MFN should be a basic requirement for a free trade regime. At the same time, experiences in trade in goods suggest that bilateral and plurilateral arrangements may also be needed to initiate and enlarge trade. It is shown below that the special characteristics of services argue even more for a mixed policy. Negotiations on trade in services have turned out to be extremely difficult and complicated. These difficulties are partly caused by the very nature of existing barriers to trade in services and partly by conflicting interests between the participating governments.
Barriers to Trade in Services
Trade in services differs in some respects from trade in goods. "By definition, a good is a physical object that can be transferred between economic units. A service, by contrast, is an intangible change in the condition of a person or a good resulting from the economic activity of some other economic unit. ,,32 Therefore, for most trade in services a physical contact between the service provider and the customer is a necessity to carry through the transaction: either the customer travels to the service provider (e. g. tourism) or, more commonly, the service supplier moves to the customer. The latter transaction usually requires investments in the country of destination. These services may be termed factorembodied services. Even if services are disembodied in the sense that they do not require physical presence for exportation (e. g. data base services), they do require the transborder movement of information. What follows is that for both factor-embodied and disembodied services the unhindered movement of factors (capital, labour, information) is a prerequisite for free trade in services.
The crucial obstacles to the movement of factors and hence to trade in services are national regulations. ~ These regulations may in effect deny market access for, or impose operating restrictions on, foreign service suppliers. 34
The telecommunications sector is an important example in which market access for foreign service providers is prohibited. Until recently in most countries national telecommunications monopolies (P-I-rs) had the exclusive right to offer public telecommunications services within their respective territories. International communications services could only be provided through the cooperation of two or more P'FI's. Although some countries have deregulated their telecommunications sector and allow for competition between national suppliers, foreign providers of communications services are rarely granted market access.Similar restrictions on market access exist in banking and especially in insurance services? s Operating restrictions on the other hand can take various forms: 36 national immigration and investment laws frequently hinder the movement of labour and capital, which in turn imposes restrictions on trade in factor-embodied services. Other typical operating restrictions include differential reserve requirements in banking and insurance, discriminatory taxation or The removal of these regulations is a difficult task, since they frequently reflect sensitive national policy goals. Differential reserve requirements in banking and insurance are justified as necessary rules for consumer protection. National security considerations are often put forward by governments as reasons for obstacles to transborder data flow. National telecommunications monopolies have been defended by reason of economic and social welfare policies.
These examples already indicate the core problem for efforts to liberalize trade in services: a proper distinction between appropriate and unreasonable regulation is a highly political task and frequently impossible. 37 Service negotiations involve high information costs and require intense and long bargaining. Not surprisingly, multilateral trade talks on services that bring together a huge number of governments with divergent interests are complex undertakings, whereas ready agreements and effective liberalization rules cannot be expected. These circumstances already suggest that in addition to multilateral strategies, bilateral and plurilateral instruments may be needed for effective liberalization.
Politics of ~ade in Services
Depending on their own economic development and competitive position in world service markets, 37 Cf. P. Nicolaides:
The Problem of Regulation in Traded Services: The Implications for Reciprocal Liberalization, in: AuBenwirtschaft, Vol. 44 (1989), No. 1, pp. 29-57. 38 For a profound analysis of the US policy cf. G. F e k e t e k u t y, op. cit., pp. 295 et seq.
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The most recent and controversial example of this strategy is the US Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988. The act provides that the US president is obliged to enter into negotiations with those countries that pursue a protectionist trade policy in telecommunications and that have been identified as "priority countries" through investigations by the US trade representative. If negotiations for a liberalization of telecommunications markets in those countries fail, then the US president is authorized to take retaliatory action. The congressional action stems partly from the growing importance of trade in telecommunications equipment and services for the US industry and partly from the perceived imbalance of a relatively liberalized and open telecommunications market in the USA compared to the relatively regulated and closed markets in other countries. The USA, which enjoys comparative advantages in many services, initiated the debate and presses for timely and effective liberalization to exploit new business opportunities for US service providers abroad. In general, the USA supports multilateral negotiations in GATT. At the same time, it calls for bilateral agreements with its most important trading partners in order to come to quicker and more profound results. The free trade arrangements with Israel and Canada constitute the first results of this policy. 38 Sectoral bilateral negotiations on the basis of reciprocity are other developments in US trade policy with respect to services. 39
The European Community may follow a similar line. It backs current talks in GATT but may well extend its bilateral agreements with Israel or EFTA members to trade in services or may conclude other bilateral treaties. Foremost for EC members, however, is the creation of a common service market in Europe as an important part of a single European market after 1992. 4~
Less developed countries perceive liberalization in trade in services as a threat to their development prospects. Hence they strive for preferential treatment by developed countries in order to build up their "infant industries" in services. Since their bargaining power is limited in bilateral negotiations, they prefer multilateral talks in GATT where they can act as a political bloc and push decisions more effectively in their direction. 41
Due to divergence of interests, simultaneous negotiations on the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels are a political reality. The difficult task ahead will be to integrate these different efforts into a harmonious policy regime that fosters desirable trade creation and minimizes inefficient trade diversion.
Proposals are presented below for a regime for free trade in services. 42 They take into account theoretical Among policy-makers a consensus emerged that initial negotiations should focus on developing an umbrella agreement that sets forth basic principles to be applied to all traded services. Following terms in trade in goods, this treaty may be called a "General Agreement on Trade in Services" (GATS). It is commonly understood that GATS should strive for the widest possible adherence of countries. Global membership, however, implies that the treaty will contain only vague principles not qualified for initiating effective liberalization. The main objective of a general agreement should rather be to provide for an institutional platform for progressive liberalization, to promote the integration of world service markets and to stabilize trade in services. 43
It was suggested above that unconditional MFN -on the premise that countries are willing to reduce trade barriers -contributes to these goals. In GATS as well, privileges and obligations should be extended immediately and unconditionally to all members of the treaty, but not necessarily to non-members. 44 In particular, as the Canadian delegation stressed, "there should be a requirement that bilateral concessions between a party to the Agreement and a non-party to the Agreement be extended automatically to all parties to the Agreement. This would ensure that the Agreement was the 'best deal' available to each party and would encourage wide participation. ''4s However, the final impact of an MFN clause will on the one hand depend on the level of liberalization steps governments are willing to accept in GATS. On the other hand, crucial will be what kind of exceptions will be allowed by provisions in the general agreement.
A Strategy for Sector Codes
Given the divergence of interests and the complexity of issues, it is important that an MFN clause in the general agreement should not preclude the subsequent conclusion of sector codes that contain higher levels of commitments between interested parties. 48 The fact that the overwhelming amount of world trade in services is currently conducted between a small number of countries (OECD members) already suggests that club arrangements will probably come into existence. 47
It is widely understood that these additional agreements are to be concluded for important service sectors, such as telecommunications, banking or insurance. These sector codes would reflect the specific regulatory environment in each sector and even address such sensitive issues as market access or direct investment in order to achieve effective liberalization. 48 Because most countries will likely not accept these far-reaching liberalization steps, in the beginning probably only a small proportion of the parties to the general agreement will sign the sector codes. In order to prevent free riders, the codes should rely on conditional MFN: the extension of concessions should be limited to countries that are willing to pay the price of liberalization and adhere to the sector treaties. Similarly, further negotiations for the reduction of trade barriers within the framework of the codes should be based on reciprocity. However, these arrangements must be open to all countries willing to fulfil the obligations laid down in the codes. Thus, they could also be termed sectoral liberalization clubs.
Though there should be no doubt about the necessity of these clubs, one has to keep in mind that club arrangements tend to distort world trade. Therefore, sector codes need to be carefully coordinated and controlled under the general agreement. The umbrella agreement must define conditions and procedures for the establishment of sectoral clubs. In order to guarantee openness and foster participation, these rules should prevent unjustified discrimination by original members of the code against newcomers. In addition, they should coordinate liberalization efforts to preclude the simultaneous existence of several bilateral or plurilateral arrangements in one sector that pursue rather protectionist goals. For example, the establishment of a bilateral sectoral treaty should only be permitted if it contains a considerably higher level of concessions than an existing plurilateral code.
If sector codes comply with these requirements, they will be an effective and crucial means for progressive liberalization in trade in services.
Economic Integration
Political reality already implies that a general agreement on trade in services will include exceptions to the rule of MFN for free trade areas and customs unions. Neither the USA nor Canada will accept the unconditional extension of concessions agreed upon bilaterally to all members of a general agreement. Similarly, the EC made it clear that it will "liberalize regulations faster among its Member States than with respect to third countries".49 And indeed, the potential of customs unions and free trade areas to create trade in services that would otherwise not exist should be exploited as long as multilateral instruments for trade in services are not available or fail. However, from a longterm perspective, one cannot overlook the danger of undesired trade distortion that is likely to occur and that -as experiences in trade in goods indicate -is difficult to remove subsequently. In fact the control and integration of bilateral and regional agreements into a global order for trade in services will probably be the most difficult challenge ahead.
It should be stressed that -given the economic potency of the EC and trade flows between Canada and the USA -existing free trade areas or customs unions should not be "grandfathered" without further examination. Instead, all existing and future bilateral or regional economic arrangements should fulfil conditions similar to those in Art. XXlV of GATT: first, a general agreement should call for a significant removal of barriers on a wide range of services in a reasonable period of time; second, trade barriers with respect to third countries maintained by the new arrangement should on the whole not be higher than before its establishment. In any case, the level of concessions among constituent territories should in general be higher than those concluded in sector codes mentioned 4~ Communication from the European Communities, Discussion Paper: A Possible Conceptual Structure for a Service Agreement, GATT Secretariat, Doc. UR-87-0439, December 1987, p. 7. so An example is the book printing industry. Recently the typesetting stage of book production has been increasingly performed by developing countries because typesetting is labour intensive and does not require high labour skills. Due to low wages developing countries have comparative cost advantages in those services. In principle, these findings can be extended to any services requiring keyboard input functions on a routine basis. Cf. B. H i n d I e y, A. S m i t h, op. cit., pp. 387 et seq.; cf. also G. F e k e t e k u t y, op. cit., pp. 116 et seq.
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above. Considering the lack of transparency in trade in services and the fact that bilateral and regional services regimes have already been erected, these rules may be even more difficult to enforce than with trade in goods.
Preferential Treatment for LDCs
Developing countries may enjoy comparative cost advantages in some service sectors, especially in labour-intensive services. 5~ If these cost advantages actually or potentially exist, then they should be exploited in order to improve the allocation of resources for the world economy. In many cases, however, service industries have still to be built up in the Third World. In the event of immediate liberalization, developing countries might not have the time to erect those "infant service industries", because their domestic markets will be dominated soon by well-established service providers from developed countries. 51 Thus, a general agreement should contain provisions that except temporarily preferential treatment for developing countries from the rule of MFN. However, it should be stressed that these provisions might well be abused by countries to pursue protectionist goals. Much more research is needed to distinguish between infant service industries and those that are and will be just inefficient.
Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view, the multilateral approach should be considered the desirable long-term policy for trade in services. In reality, due to complexity of issues and divergence of interests, a multilateral regime containing profound rules for liberalization is hard to achieve. In fact there is a risk that an uncoordinated network of bilateral and regional arrangements might develop. A further distortion of world service markets can be suspected as the harmful result of such a policy.
However, as Charles Kindleberger put it when reflecting on international trade in general, "Instinct seems to suggest that there is room for a position between the idealistic attempt to re-establish a bygone multilateralism and cynicism which would suggest that bilateralism is the inescapable road of the future."S2From our point of view, at least for free trade in services, a mixed policy with an emphasis on liberalization clubs to be coordinated under a multilateral umbrella could be the second best solution. 
